Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis
The study of the tort of malicious prosecution is properly the study of systems to defend the law from misuse. The problem of frivolous suits bothered early legal systems 1 just as it troubles modern jurisprudence, 2 and though these older systems defined wrongful initiation of legal process more expansively than we and punished it more harshly, 3 our present law is their descendant.
The tort of malicious prosecution, 4 the centerpiece of the present American system for deterring groundless litigation, 3 has recently received considerable scholarly attention. 6 Courts generally recognize one of two forms of the tort. In about one-third of American jurisdictions, 7 plaintiffs who have brought actions for malicious prosecution have found the remedy all but useless, because of the restrictions of the English Rule, which requires a showing of special damage. 8 In a slightly larger number of jurisdictions, malicious prosecution plaintiffs have enjoyed the somewhat less restrictive Restatement Rule, which lacks a special damage requirement.' 0 This Note analyzes the history of Anglo-American attempts to discourage malicious civil suits. The analysis begins in the seventh century with the laws of Kentish kings, and focuses on the historical bases for the modem system and the changing balance among the policies that the different rules have attempted to serve. The Note argues that both of the current rules share significant defects unrelated to the advisability of the special damages requirement, and that the American system for dealing with groundless suits is sensitive neither to the history in which it has its roots nor to the needs of the modem judiciary. It proposes adoption of a new remedial framework that incorporates historically proven solutions, and demonstrates that such a system would be functionally superior to and historically more justifiable than that which is currently employed.
I. The Present American Controversy
Both the English and Restatement Rules require pleading and proof of three basic elements: termination of the underlying suit in the original defendant's favor," lack of probable cause for the underlying suit, 12 English Rule adds a fourth element: the underlying suit must have caused some form of damage beyond that generally attendant upon similar forms of litigation.1 4 Compensatory damages under either rule include all expenses and damage incurred by reason of the wrongful litigation, 15 and both rules permit punitive damages. 1 6 The debate about the two rules is informed by four competing policies. Those authorities that favor the English Rule 1 7 stress both the need to encourage the honest litigant to seek judicial redress by protecting him from reprisal,' 8 and the value of resolving litigation quickly and with finality.' 9 Proponents of the Restatement Rule 2 emphasize both the need to deter groundless suits 21 and the fairness of making wronged defendants whole. 2 2 An ideal system for remedying purpose other than the adjudication of the claim in suit," id. at 855; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 676 (1977) , but it has also been defined as reckless disregard of the rights of the defendant, see note 118 infra (citing authorities).
14. See ,iotes 7 &, 8 supra.
15. See, e.g., Connelly v. White, 122 Iowa 391, 395-96, 98 N.W. 144, 145-46 (1904) (English Rule); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 681 (1977) . No case has held that the expense of the malicious prosecution action itself is recoverable. 332-34 (Sup. Ct. 1816) , though that history is false at worst and misleadingly incomplete at best, see pp. 1221-29 infra. Although English Rule jurisdictions may agree that the special damages requirement is ill-suited to the role in which they cast it, they argue that the Restatement Rule is no better, see Aalfs v. Aalfs, 246 Iowa 158, 163, 66 N.W.2d 121, 124 (1954) , and that any change must come through the legislature, see O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 521, 569 P.2d 561, 565-66 (1977) ; cf. Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 330, 332-33, 338 (Sup. Ct. 1816) (only legislature can reestablish costs sanction).
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. Walker-Smith Co., 47 N.M. 310, 313, 142 P.2d 546, 548 (1943); Petrich v. McDonald, 44 Wash. 2d 211, 217, 266 P.2d 1047 , 1050 (1954 .
19. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Silver Lake Lodge, 29 Or. 294, 297, 45 P. 798, 798 (1896) groundless litigation would promote each of these four policies -3 rather than compelling courts to choose among them. The quest for such a system began centuries ago. 24 Yet among the world's legal systems only the American places a subsequent tort action at the core of its machinery for dealing with groundless litigation.
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Historical analysis shows that the common law never expected the tort of malicious prosecution to resolve the competing policies that surround the problem of groundless litigation; rather, the tort has inherited that function by default. In fact, the American system represents a significant departure from the preferred solution of the common law, which from pre-Norman times to the present has placed primary reliance on controls available within groundless suits. Historically, subsequent actions have been only a supplement to internal sanctions.
II. The Evolution of the Current Systems

A. Early Developments
Anglo-Saxon courts employed a simple system for guarding against false suits: the complainant unfortunate enough to lose his cause also lost his tongue, 26 or, if that option proved distasteful, was compelled to pay his opponent compensation, called wer, which was fixed according to the complainant's status. 2 7 Each complainant was required to provide sureties-borh-who were subjected to the same penalties if the complainant could not be found.
28
These simple though harsh sanctions, imposed in the action itself, were prompt and probably effective. They served a dual function. 23 . At some level, any system that deters groundless suits will also discourage some suits that are legitimate. The object is therefore to minimize the conflict while striving for optimal deterrence. See notes 94, 125 infra. 27. Wer (also wergild) was the status-based blood price placed on each man that could be paid to his family to atone for his murder, and that he himself was compelled to pay for certain crimes. See 2 B. THORPE, sup~ra note 26 (glossary). The amount was significant, see 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 515 n.4 (wer for citizen of London during Henry I's reign (1100-35) was 100 shillings, then large sum).
28. The borh was required as a guarantee of the plaintiff's good faith and willingness to submit to the court's decision. See Hlothaere & Eadric 8 & 9 (673-87 A.D.) , reprinted in I B. THORPE, suPra note 26, at 31. First, they punished and deterred false suits, thus protecting individuals from abuse 2 9 and protecting the judicial machinery from misuse. Second, they sometimes produced compensation (wer) for wronged defendants. 3 0
The system, however, was designed for a medieval trial in which God was the judge, and hence it equated an unsuccessful with a false suit.
3 1 In such a system there could be no place for the honest but mistaken litigant, whose access to the courts today's authorities guard jealously. Further, it provided rather random recompense to defendants, because any payment varied with the complainant's status and not with the extent of the wrong done. The system of taxing fixed wer in response to false suits did not long survive the Norman conquest. It gave way to a new and more flexible system that evolved from the Norman traditions-amercement.
32
The amercement system did not exact a previously fixed penalty from the losing plaintiff and in strict theory was not automatically applied to every case. 33 In practice, however, immediately following the determination of the underlying suit, judges found virtually all 4 losing plaintiffs to be in the King's 35 mercy for a false claim. 3 6 Liability then attached for some monetary penalty, 37 which was assessed or "affeered" by honest men of the neighborhood. 3 8 Once the penalty had been ascertained, the losing plaintiff or his pledges would pay it to the court. Though the system shared functional similarities with its predecessor, 40 the courts had a more flexible sanction in amercement than in the penalties of wer and loss of tongue.
4 1 Because penalties were assessed according to the extent of the wrong done, 42 they could in theory range from all one's possessions to only pennies. 4 -Amercement thus allowed more selective deterrence than the older system had provided, and left room for honest though unsuccessful suits.
44
The system had its shortcomings as well, two of which were central. First, wronged defendants received no compensation; rather, the amercement was paid to the king, lord, or sheriff in whose court the wrongful suit had been brought. 45 Second, since amercements could penalize only those before the court, the law found itself unable to deal effectively with groundless suits brought through straw parties. 4 6 At the same time, the new process of indictment 47 allowed the unscrupulous to subject a victim to legal proceedings and possible punishment for breach of the king's laws without submitting even a straw plaintiff to the jurisdiction of the court. 40. In both systems, liability for the sanction was established simultaneously with the determination of the underlying suit, though the extent of the sanction was determined at a later stage in the process. See pp. 1221, 1222 supra. Sureties were required in both systems. See notes 28, 39 supra (citing authorities). Finally, both systems were more concerned with penalizing wrongdoing than with making victims whole. See p. 1222 supra; 4 W. HoLoSWoRTH, suPra note 39, at 536, 537. Actual injury was not a measure of either punishment or compensation. Thus amercement was affeered not according to the harm done, but "according to the gravity of the offense, according as it is great or small," 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 38, at 329-30, and wer was also independent of the damage actually caused, cf. Statute of Marleberge, 52 Hen. 3, c. 6, § 2 (1267) (grants costs to victorious defendants in actions under writ of right of ward; provides also that losing plaintiffs be amerced 48. Through indictments, the early juries of presentment, the forerunners of today's grand juries, were responsible for bringing reputed criminals to the royal attention. Id. The jurors themselves could be punished through amercement. P. WINFIELD, supra note The absence of compensation to wronged defendants left amercement's ability to deter false suits unaffected, and sparked only sporadic and limited legislation 49 until the sixteenth century. 50 But amercement's failure to control falsely instigated indictments and strawparty suits presented a threat to the integrity of the legal system itself, 51 and demanded a remedy. The English legal system responded with the writ of conspiracy 52 in 1293.
3
Unlike its modern descendants, conspiracy took aim not at all malicious suits, nor even at those causing special hardships, but solely at straw-party actions. 54 The writ granted wronged defendants limited 24, at 14. But if one merely suggested the existence of a crime to the jury, one could escape personal responsibility and possible amercement if the accusation proved false. Prior to the development of indictment, all accusations were handled through a process that appears civil: even serious felonies were brought before the court through the wronged party's accusation, called an "appeal," 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 572, and were provable through oath, ordeal, or battle, id. at 598-606.
49. Only one statute prior to 1500 gave victorious defendants their costs: The Statute of Marleberge, 52 Hen. 3, c. 6, § 2 (1267) (limited to writ of right of ward). See J. HULLOCK, THE LA W OF COSTS 124 (Dublin 1793). One other statute gave costs to successful defendants in a writ of error, but only if they had been plaintiffs below: Costs, &c. awarded to the plaintiff, where the defendant sueth a writ of error, 3 Hen. 7, c. 10 (1486).
50. SoCIrY 194, 196 (1905) (possibly ambiguous) (writ not founded on common law).
54. See note 52 supra.
rights to sue those who procured third parties to instigate groundless actions, but granted no remedy against an individual plaintiff who sued without ground. 5 5 Moreover, the writ required not only a showing that false claims had been made in court but also a further showing of malice: 56 the subsequent sanction was limited to the most egregious of groundless actions, and did not extend, as did amercement, to simple false suits. 5 7 The writ of conspiracy was, in a sense, a commission for defendants to act as private attorneys general in protecting the system on its vulnerable flank. 58 The writ marked the first time the English legal system recognized a general right of action for wrongful initiation of legal process, 59 and represented a change in the already ancient pattern of internal sanctions against false suits. Yet the new remedy remained generally limited to a penalty for straw-party actions. 0 0 Thus the break with tradition was relatively minor; the law assessed penalties for groundless suits"' through the procedure of a suit for damages only when the wrongdoer had not placed himself before the court.
See id.
56. See P. WINFIELD, supra note 24, at 66-81. Other essentials for liability on the mature writ were procurement, id. at 81-83, combination, id. at 59-65, and a determination of the underlying suit in the now-plaintiff's favor, id. at 83-87.
57. See p. 1222 supra. 58. Sayles suggests that the essence of conspiracy was damages. SAYLES, supra note 36, at Ixii. This is true, but only from the point of view of the wronged defendant, whom the law enticed into an enforcement role by the promise of a remedy. From a systemic point of view, the writ was in essence a procedure for sanction. The tension between the two functions that the tort has been called on to serve-remedy and sanction-contributed significantly to confusion throughout its development. See Savile v. Roberts, I Ld. Raym. 374, 378-79, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 , 1150 (1698 
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The effectiveness of the amercement-conspiracy system depended primarily on the continuing vitality of the internal sanction. But amercement, which had once formed a branch of the royal revenue,", was in a long but steady process of decline. 63 As one consequence, the law was threatened with the loss of effective internal sanctions against false suits. The situation grew intolerable, and evoked simultaneous responses from Parliament and from the courts.
Parliament responded by shoring up the internal sanctions through a series of costs statutes enacted over several centuries, 4 each of which 62. See E. COKE, FIRST INSTITUTES *161a n.4 (F. Hargrave 8-C. Butler eds. 1817). 63. Holdsworth suggests that the practice was naturally superseded by the process of "making fine." See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENLIstH LAW 391 (5th ed. 1942). His sources, however, do not suggest that fines took the place of amercements. It is more likely that ever-stricter limitations on the size of amercement resulted from changing attitudes toward the "wrongs" amercement punished. Since both plaintiffs and defendants could suffer amercement for losing a suit, see note 32 supra, limitations on its size, like limitations on the costs statutes, see note 106 infra, might well have been viewed as protecting the honest litigant.
The resulting decline can be traced from amercement's origins as a penalty of all one's chattels, see note 32 supra; through Henry I's promise to limit the sanction to no more than 100 shillings, 2 POLLOCK & MAITLNO, supra note 1, at 515 n.4; Becket's belief that the law of Kent limited amercements to 40 shillings, id. at 514; Bracton's procedural constraints, 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 38, at 329-30; Fitzherbert's expectation that amercements would typically run four to six shillings, A. FITZHERBERT, NATURA BREviUM 76A; to Lord Holt's statement that amercement had become a matter of form, Savile v. Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 374, 380, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1151 (1698). One hundred shillings was a heavy penalty in 1100. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 515 n.4. Six shillings, however, was just enough for a meal in 1600: Shakespeare has Falstaff spend about ten shillings on a meal, five shillings eightpence on two gallons of sack alone. HENRY IV, PART I, Act 11, scene iv.
64. The most important defendants' costs statutes were: An act that the plaintiff, being nonsuited, shall yield damages to the defendants in actions personal, by the discretion of the justices, 23 Hen. 8, c. 15, § 1 (1531) (costs allowed to prevailing defendants in actions of trespass, debt or covenant, detinue, account, case, or on contract or statute); An act to give costs to the defendant upon a nonsuit of the plaintiff, or verdict against him, 4 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1606) (extending defendants' costs to all cases in which prevailing plaintiff might have costs).
That costs were a direct response to mounting groundless suits-and an indirect response to the failure of amercement-is explicitly recognized in the statutes themselves, see, e.g., Costs, &c., awarded to the plaintiff, where the defendant sueth a writ of error, 3 Hen. 7, c. 10 (1486) (to discourage groundless appeals for delay only); An act for the avoiding of wrongful vexation touching the writ of Latitat, The costs system was a synthesis of the internal sanctions it succeeded. Like amercements, it was flexible, though the flexibility was in the discretion of the court. See, e.g., An act to give costs to the defendant upon a nonsuit of the plaintiff, or verdict against him, 4 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1606); An act that the plaintiff, being nonsuited, shall yield damages to the defendants in actions personal, by the discretion of the justices, 23 Hen. 8, c. 15, § 1 (1531). Like both previous systems, the sanction was limited, this time to necessary costs of suit, including attorneys' fees. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 856-59 (1929). Like we-, it provided compensation. Like amercement, it punished groundless litigation left the costs sanction broader and more useful than the one before. The costs statutes also reestablished the ancient policy of providing some measure of compensation to wronged defendants. Taxable costs, however, were limited to the direct expenses of the litigation, and did not extend to many forms of consequential damages, such as those arising from arrest of the person or attachment of property. 0 5 Costs thus fell short of being either a comprehensive internal sanction or a complete remedy and, in the areas of possible damage beyond the perimeter of a costs award, the action on the case in the nature of conspiracy evolved into the English Rule for malicious prosecution. 0
B. Emergence of the Modern Rule
The action on the case presented courts with the opportunity to fashion, by analogy to writs of conspiracy, 0 7 a cause of action that would fit those forms of malicious prosecution that had become unreachable through the internal sanctions. 8 Case, it was said, would lie against more severely than it punished merely unsuccessful suits. See, e.g., An act for the better preventing frivolous and vexatious suits, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 11, § 1 (1697) (no costs assessed if probable cause found in multiple-defendant suits). 65. In the most egregious cases, when the plaintiffs caused arrest or attachment and then delayed prosecution of the underlying claim or were nonsuited, a narrowly drawn statute allowed judges to tax both costs and damages. See An act for the avoiding of wrongful vexation touching the writ of Latitat, 8 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1565).
66. The older writs against misuse of procedure simply could not cover the wrongs that costs did not encompass. Conspiracy was hampered by its limitation to straw-party suits, as were champerty and maintenance. See P. WINFIELD, supra note 24, at 131-38. Properly applied, deceit was limited to fraud on the court, 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, suPra note 1, at 535, though it had grown in uncertain fashion into the area of false and malicious suits, see A. FITZHERBERT, supra note 63, at *98N. Even when the old forms technically applied, they were frequently rendered useless by the complexities of their own procedure. Thus the tort of malicious prosecution in England is part of a comprehensive system for dealing with wrongful litigation, a system that has not changed its essential outline in over a millenium. The central feature has always been some form of internal sanction-wer or corporal punishment, amercement, or costs. Subsequent actions of conspiracy or case were never designed to carry the primary burden of deterring false suits; that function had always been reserved for internal sanctions. Subsequent suits were developed for and limited to the extraordinary case for which the internal sanctions provided neither deterrent nor remedy.
That system continues today in England and in other common law jurisdictions. 7 8 In the United States, however, the core of the structure withered. 79 Costs lost their deterrent effect as they proved less of a burden to the wrongdoer, 8 0 provided less of a remedy as they met less of the victim's expenses, 8 ' and could no longer be fashioned to meet the wrong as judicial discretion was curtailed. 82 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, costs had ceased to perform the function for which they had been designed-deterring false suits 8 3-and the inherited system collapsed. Litigants responded to the collapse in two ways. One way was to attempt to establish judicial power to tax costs without legislative authority. 8 4 This course was rejected, largely because the costs sanction traditionally had been closely controlled by statutes.s 5 The other way was to seek redress through malicious prosecution actions, but here resources were limited, for the inherited English Rule was encrusted with constraints resulting from. centuries of coexistence with and judicial preference for internal sanctions.
A majority of the American jurisdictions that have confronted the limited tort have been willing to overcome the traditional "special damages" constraint in order to provide a deterrent" and a remedy1
7 not otherwise available. Yet a substantial minority has rejected that solution, 8 8 both because its members feel that the action gives a remedy the legislature has chosen not to provide s9 and because they are unwilling to impose the inefficiency and improper deterrence inherent in the broader rule on themselves and on honest litigants before them.9 0 The result is the split in American jurisdictions discussed in Part I. But the debate over which of these rules should prevail obscures the underlying problem that both rules share: a remedial system for controlling groundless litigation that relies exclusively on subsequent suits does not effectively serve the purposes for which courts attempt to use it. Under either variation of the present system, many factors intervene to prevent the threat of subsequent suit and ultimate liability from presenting an effective deterrent to groundless suits. A truly malicious litigant might expect that his victim will settle a suit rather than incur 84 41, 44 (1943) .
Malicious Prosecution the prohibitive cost of two trials-one on the merits and one on the issue of probable cause. 9 1 Even if the victim could finance the necessary' litigation, a malicious plaintiff might well undergo the slim risk of ultimate adverse judgment on probable cause to gain the tactical advantage that tying up an opponent in litigation can provide. 92 In some cases that risk may be lessened still further by practical obstacles to the subsequent suit.
3
At the same time, plaintiffs with honest cases may feel a deterrent effect that is only remotely related to the question of whether their suit is one the legal system desires to encourage. 94 The plaintiff who has lost a close case may be subjected to the same subsequent suit as the plaintiff whose case lacked all merit, and the costs of that subsequent suit are inescapable regardless of the outcome on the issue of probable cause. 94. The lack of correlation between absence of probable cause and deterrent effect can be expressed analytically. Let P 1 = the probability that the original suit will end in a judgment against the plaintiff, P, = the probability that the original defendant will bring a malicious prosecution action, P, = the probability that liability for malicious prosecution will result. Let Cr. = the cost of the subsequent suit to the original plaintiff, CA, = the cost of the original suit to the original defendant, and E = the exemplary damages that may be assessed in the malicious prosecution action. The deterrent available in the current system, eliminating minor factors, is: P 1 X P2 x (Clr. + Pz,(CAI + E)).
Any factor that increases the probability of subsequent suit will increase the deterrent effect even if the plaintiff is sure that neither malice nor lack of probable cause can be found; therefore even honest plaintiffs are deterred because they will have to bear the costs of the subsequent action whether they had cause or not. Courts have generally adjusted the deterrent effect by tinkering with the likelihood of ultimate liability on the subsequent suit, (P.), which can indirectly affect the likelihood that suit will be brought, (P2). Thus, courts justify requirements other than lack of probable cause because they "protect the honest litigant." See p. 1220 supra (special damages); note 108 infra (malice). Ideally, the deterrent should only vary with the unjustifiability of the suit. See note 125 infra.
95. See note 94 supra. Although the elements of the Restatement Rule-termination for defendant, malice, and lack of probable cause-all must be alleged, only favorable prior termination is susceptible of simple disproof. The other requisites offer small disincentive to one who wishes to use the subsequent action to harass an opponent, though they may protect an honest plaintiff from ultimate liability. Thus, subsequent suits as a remedy present another problem for the law: the harassment of honest litigants.
Even under the English Rule, litigation to determine the applicability of the special-damages requirement remains a real possibility.
In addition, victims of groundless litigation under either rule are not likely to be made whole. 96 Even if they can afford the gamble of a malicious prosecution action and are ultimately successful, the expenses of the subsequent proceeding will not be an item of recoverable damages * A wronged defendant must rely on the uncertain possibility of punitive damages for full compensation.
8
Finally, a system of subsequent suits requires a second trial of essentially identical factual material 0 in order to determine whether the first action should ever have been brought. 1 0 0 Such spawned litigation is undesirable when judicial institutions are already overloaded.' 0 '
Thus the present American system fails to serve effectively the policies that a remedial framework for deterring groundless litigation should be designed to implement. Both the Restatement and English Rules, taken as primary systems for handling groundless suits, ignore the teaching of the common law: the tort of malicious prosecution was designed to function as a secondary defense within a general system of internal controls.
10 2 The problems surrounding the two rules are the result of exclusive reliance on subsequent sanctions, and can only be solved by reintegrating the advantages offered by internal sanctions.
III. A Common Law Proposal
An internal sanction could be reestablished through costs assessed in the discretion of the court. Though revival of that sanction may be 96. See Gold, supra note 2, at 48 (discussing bleak prospect of yet another suit from perspective of original defendant).
97. 0 4 Courts are also unlikely to develop the costs sanction independently; judges have been extraordinarily reluctant to assert an inherent power to tax costs, 1°5 in part because that power has historically been closely controlled by the legislature.
6
A second possibility is to permit defendants to plead malicious prosecution as a counterclaim.
0 7 Yet the traditional tort carries constraints appropriate to a subsequent action that would hinder its usefulness as an internal sanction. 306, 306 (1796) . Although the deference is justified as to costs per se, its transference to the malicious prosecution debate is based on an excess of judicial caution caused by simple misinformation. The legislature's role with respect to internal sanctions generally has been vastly exaggerated. See note 59 supra; Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 466 , 71 N.W. 558, 560 (1897) (viewing costs as first internal sanction and erroneously reporting broad effect for early costs statutes). Prior to the creation of the costs sanction, two different regimes of internal sanctions had come and gone, neither of which depended on explicit legislative grants. See pp. 1221-26 supra. To the extent that reasons should be inferred from the legislative failure to update the costs statutes, but see note 79 supra, those reasons are that it is not desirable to deter honest litigants, see Gold, supra note 2, at 53, or to penalize losing litigants in close cases, see Comment, supra note 79, at 649-50, 652. Such a view does not justify a radical alteration in the structure of the common law system for combatting groundless suits. If a system of internal sanctions that avoids excessive deterrence and unfair penalty can be developed from existing judicial powers, no legislative prerogative or policy will have been invaded and the preferred policy of the common law will have been served.
107. The tactic has been proposed, see Wright, supra note 99, at 444; Note, supra note 6, at 664, 684, and some courts have experimented with the approach, e.g., Eiteljorg v. Bogner, 502 P.2d 970, 971 (Colo. App. 1972); Sonnichsen v. Streeter, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 659, 666-67, 239 A.2d 63, 68 (1967) . Others suggest they would look favorably on such a course. E.g., Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, 150, 83 A.2d 246, 251 (Ch. 1951 A better option is a new tort action: 0 9 a compulsory counterclaim" 0 for "groundless suit." Through such a counterclaim, courts could integrate the advantages of the ancient, internal remedies into their dispute-resolution function."' The counterclaim would involve three stages. The first would coincide with the case on the merits," 2 and encompass only proof on the issue of lack of probable cause. 1 3 The original defendant's proof of developed to avoid duplication of the remedy already available through costs, would usually render a malicious prosecution counterclaim a waste of time. The element of malice, which has survived since the writ of conspiracy precisely because it protects honest litigants, see Jones v. Gwynn, 10 Mod. 214, 218, 88 Eng. Rep. 699, 701 (1714) ; W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 851, would introduce issues irrelevant to the merits of the original action and thus disrupt swift and just determination of the original claim. If the defense of advice of counsel, which protects good-faith litigants from liability in a subsequent action, were raised in the context of a counterclaim in the original suit, the plaintiff might be forced to change counsel, thus increasing the expense of his lawsuit as well as disrupting the speedy resolution of his claims. See note 124 infra. Finally, the confusion involved in attempting to reshape the action into one useful as an internal sanction would hinder its success, for the elements of the old tort are deeply ingrained in the law. See, e.g., Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 845, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 181 (1971) (rejects malicious prosecution counterclaim, argues that "hornbook law" requires termination of prior proceeding before action will lie); Note, supra note 93, at 490-95. 110. "Compulsory" here is used in the same sense as in FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a): the defendant may choose not to bring the counterclaim, but a subsequent suit will not be available as an option.
111. The analogue created would combine the more useful features of the prior forms of internal sanctions. Thus, the root issue-probable cause-would be decided simultaneously with the determination of the merits of the underlying claim, thereby maximizing judicial efficiency, as in all previous systems. The system for determining appropriate sanctions would not interfere with the trial of the original claim, just as in all previous systems. See notes 26 & 27 suPra (wer sanction set by custom); p. 1222 supra (amercement sanction determined by specially appointed panel); Goodhart, supra note 64, at 855 (sanction determined subsequently by special taxing master). The defendant would be recompensed, as with wer and costs, and the sanction would be flexible, as with amercement and costs. Finally, like amercement, the system would minimize the threat to honest litigants.
112. The cause of action thus "matures" as of the moment a claim the defendant believes to be groundless is filed. Cf. 6 C. WRIGHT 663 (1975) (reasonably or ordinarily prudent man on reasonable grounds). It is not necessary that the law be clear before a belief that facts support a claim is reasonable; when there is ambiguity, a plaintiff may rely on any reasonably supportable interpretation. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Herlein, 543 P.2d 1283 , 1285 (Colo. App. 1975 . Probable cause is measured by an objective standard; plaintiff's motivation is not relevant. The only inquiry would be whether, with facts known to plaintiff or facts ascertainable by plaintiff on reasonable inquiry, a "reasonable" person would have thought he or she had a valid claim.
that narrow issue would present largely the same factual questions as would the defense to the underlying action," 4 but the standard of proof would be more difficult to sustain than that required by a simple defense. In this stage, the original defendant would have to demonstrate such an insufficiency of reasonably reliable evidence that no reasonable person confronted with such evidence could have believed that the action brought might succeed."1 5
The second stage would be the judge's decision on the issue of probable cause, which would follow immediately the decision on the merits by the finder of fact, whether judge or jury. 1 6 Unless a lack of probable cause were found, the counterclaim would terminate with the end of the trial on the merits.
The third stage would involve a determination of damages. Central to this stage would be proof of purely compensatory damages, but the defendant would also be entitled to demonstrate any aggravating circumstance that might call for punitive damages, such as willful misuse of the courts"1 7 or reckless disregard of the rights of the defendant."
Compensatory damages would be assessed according to the amount of damage actually caused, 119 while punitive damages would depend on the extent of the wrong committed. 2 0 Hence, wronged defendants would be fully compensated.
114. See Wright, supra note 99, at 444.
115. The precise formulation of the burden that the defendant must meet will vary with each jurisdiction's definition of probable cause. See note 113 supra. If a case arose in which proof of lack of probable cause included a large number of facts irrelevant to a determination of the underlying suit and was therefore potentially confusing to a finder of fact, or a hindrance to swift judgment on the original claim, the judge would be free to order a separate hearing on that material under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b), or the equivalent state provision. Note, however, that the defendant would need to show only that the claim alleged was groundless; thus, an action for fraud could be groundless though the facts supported an action for breach of warranty.
116. Almost all jurisdictions require that probable cause be decided by the judge even in a trial for malicious prosecution alone, in which problems of jury confusion over multiple burdens of proof present even less difficulty than they would here. The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 1218 Vol. 88: , 1979 The proposed counterclaim would further each of the goals involved in the debate over systems for controlling groundless litigation.' 2 ' Groundless suits would be deterred because the counterclaim is a prompt 122 and unavoidable1 23 procedure for determining appropriate sanctions. Honest litigants would have the benefit of a system in which the extent to which they are deterred is directly related to their perception of the merit of their claim; 2 4 if they were satisfied that they had probable cause, deterrence would be minimal.
2 5 Since the proposed system would not require bringing an expensive separate action just to obtain relief, it provides victims of groundless litigation with a complete judicial remedy for the injury they have suffered. Finally, the system would promote judicial efficiency both by deterring malicious 121. See p. 1220 supra. 122. The sanction's promptness, coupled with the prospect of a complete remedy, would help maliciously prosecuted defendants to avoid unfavorable settlements and would thus provide a deterrent even in complex and expensive cases. Attorneys might even be willing to undertake the defense of a maliciously prosecuted action on a contingent fee.
123. No jurisdictional problems would arise, for even when issues were separated for trial the court would retain jurisdiction over the counterclaim. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(i); cf. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (counterclaim allowed).
124. The objective nature of the proposed definition of probable cause means that a few plaintiffs who have retained negligent counsel and sued in good faith on the strength of counsel's advice may be subject to ultimate liability. Although these plaintiffs would have probable cause as that concept has traditionality been understood, see W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 854, the suit itself would still be without probable cause. Such suits have been punished under all prior systems of internal sanctions. The real wrongdoer in such a case is the plaintiff's attorney, but the defendant could not recover from him in a subsequent suit for simple negligence under current law. See Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922-23, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240-41 (1975) . Thus, a plaintiff's defense of good faith based on attorney advice might leave the defendant uncompensated. It would also interfere with plaintiff's case on the merits by requiring his attorney to testify and therefore to be replaced as counsel. A better system would allow innocent plaintiffs who are misled by their attorneys into filing wrongful suits to recover from their lawyers in subsequent malpractice actions on proof of simple negligence. See Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 584, 328 P.2d 164, 166 (1958) . For similar reasons, the law should not permit a defendant to implead plaintiff's counsel in the counterclaim.
A defense of advice of counsel might be appropriate in the hearing on damages to rebut an inference of malice. At this stage, when the plaintiff has already been judicially determined to have sued without probable cause, the danger of disrupting the original claim on the merits is nil.
125. The proposed system should be analyzed using the same model used in note 94 supra. Here P. approaches I and may be safely ignored, because plaintiffs would assume that a counterclaim will be brought. The additional cost imposed on the plaintiff by the probable-cause inquiry during the trial on the merits would be nominal, and may likewise be safely ignored. Here the formula for deterrence is significantly different: P 1 X P, X (C, + CA 1 + E).
The critical fact is the difference in the structure of the expression: the entire amount of the deterrence is proportional to the probability that lack of probable cause will be found, and hence to the justifiability of the original suit. In addition, the cost of the damages proceeding, C7r,, will be significantly less than the cost of a full subsequent trial, so that the "substantive" damages, CA, + E, play a larger role in the damages portion of the formula. Though the total deterrent effect of the two systems may occasionally be the same, the deterrence provided by the subsequent-suit system would only be appropriate accidentally. Thus the proposed system is qualitatively superior to the present system. litigation that would otherwise arise, and by minimizing the judicial resources necessary to deal with any groundless litigation that may still be brought.
Even with the suggested counterclaim operating as an internal sanction, the present tort of malicious prosecution would continue, though curtailed in scope. The tort would still be used in its traditional role, limited to groundless litigation unreachable through the internal sanction-including wrongful nonjudicia1126 or quasi-judicial 27 proceedings, specialized judicial proceedings in which the counterclaim cannot be brought, 1 28 or straw-party actions. 1 29 Thus limited, the tort of malicious prosecution would once again serve its proper function as a supplement to internal sanctions. 130 
Conclusion
The proposed remedial system represents not just a resolution of the policy debate between the two present American rules, but a logical evolution of the common law. It places the subsequent suit for malicious prosecution back in its proper context as a necessary but carefully limited adjunct to a comprehensive system of internal sanctions against groundless litigation. In so doing it vindicates the common law's long-standing policy against spawned litigation, while reinvigorating the still older policy against allowing misuse of the courts to go unrecompensed and unpunished. The proposal establishes a workable modem analogue of the historically proven systems for striking a proper balance between discouraging false suits and encouraging resort to law. 128. E.g., quasi-criminal proceedings, such as mental-competency or juvenile-delinquency proceedings.
See
129. E.g., ordinary civil or administrative proceedings in which a person can be required to participate in an investigation of his or her own actions based on information provided by a third party as in unemployment compensation. This category could also encompass actions against an opposing counsel when he has been the motivating force behind groundless litigation, as may occur in some class actions. Three controls could insure that subsequent suits against malicious straw-party actions were not misused: first, a counterclaim for groundless suit would lie within an action for malicious prosecution; second, a requirement of prior judicial determination of lack of probable cause could be imposed; third, courts could demand pleading and proof that a judgment for groundless suit was uncollectable from the nominal plaintiff in the underlying suit.
130. This Note has concentrated on a defendant's remedies and sanctions. But, as Professor Ehrenzweig notes, the problem of the plaintiff who has a claim that both he and defendant know is good, but who will have to expend more than the amount of the claim to demonstrate that which is already known to the parties, is no less acute. Ehrenzweig, sulfra note 25, at 792; cf. Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Il1. 549, 553-54, 46 N.E.2d 41, 43-44 (1943) (attempted claim for malicious defense). History and logic appear to suggest, as a remedy for this problem, the creation of a plaintiff's cause of action for "groundless defense" similar to that proposed for defendants in this Note.
